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                                               Abstract 
 
Co-location on the JSE took place on the 14th of May 2014. This dissertation looks at 
the impact this event has had on the market. In order to measure the effects of co-
location, market quality factors are examined before and after the event to see whether 
there were any significant changes. A regression is then undertaken to see the 
correlation between co-location, liquidity and volatility. Our results suggest that co-
location benefits market liquidity but we are unable to assess the relationship with 
volatility. This means that the growing liquidity in the market can be used to attract 
more institutions and firms wishing to run trading algorithms and strategies. Trades 
originally meant for dark pools can be now traded on the JSE co-location servers. By 
moving trades from dark pools to co-location servers at the JSE and encouraging 
institutions to use these facilities, transparency can be increased. Exchanges should 
implement kill switches if it is apparent that they are being impaired or flooded with 
erroneous orders. The deployment of kill switches, circuit breakers and other system 
compliance will improve investor confidence and market stability. Subsequent 
research can lead to better understanding by investigating the correlation between co-
location and volatility. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This paper examines a host of recent empirical and theoretical research on co-location so that 
policymakers, researchers, practitioners and other stakeholders can become familiar with the 
current state of knowledge and some of the outstanding economic issues associated with co-
location. It then goes on to investigate whether the recent co-location in May 2014 has improved 
market quality. 
Proximity to markets matters. Market movements are usually observed first by those closest to it. 
In the past such closeness to the market was gained by acquiring a seat on the exchange. These 
days, proximity involves subscribing to direct data connections and co-locating trading servers at 
the exchange. Co-location is when financial institutions are allowed to place their trading servers 
in the same data centers that house an exchange’s computer servers (Brogaard et al., 2013). This 
is done for a certain fee charged by the respective exchange. A business might choose a co-
location over building its own data center for several reasons. The main driver is the capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) associated with building, maintaining and updating a large computing 
facility. “Co-location raises issues related to competition between market members, equal access 
to the market, and the cost of such services, but the regulatory framework that governs these 
services is explicitly and carefully designed to minimize these issues” (Aitken et al., 2014). The 
JSE co-location facility allows customers to host their infrastructure in the same vicinity as the 
infrastructure that drives the markets. This will enable low latency trading strategies through 
high speed trading and market data access. The latency will be 100 microseconds compared to 
the existing 2400 microseconds for the surrounding Sandton area, an astounding 24 times faster 
(Johannesburg Stock Exchange: 2013). Latency is the time it takes for an order to travel from the 
computer server of a broker to the exchange’s trading system and back. This will be the first co-
location facility in Africa. Some exchanges that have co-located include NYSE 
Euronext, NASDAQ OMX and London Stock Exchange (LSE) among others. One of the 
advantages of co-location is greater latency. There is improved quick trading for all JSE markets. 
New trading strategies are also developed as a result of co-location. This is because potential 
execution probability is increased and there is enhanced response to market movement. Another 
advantage is cost saving which results from reduced cost of bandwidth for JSE clients as they no 
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longer have to put up their own servers to increase speed. Lastly risk mitigation is a product of 
co-location. An example of this is reduced dependence on telecommunications service providers. 
1.1 Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
Exchanges are formal marketplaces where financial instruments are bought and sold. They are 
governed by law and the exchanges’ rules and regulations. The advantages of an exchange 
relative to an over-the-counter market are lower credit risk, anonymity of trading parties, greater 
market regulation and higher market liquidity (Goodspeed: 2013). Generally equities are 
exchange traded. The JSE controls trading in South African equities. The exchange clearing 
house assumes the counterparty credit risk of all trading parties and trading parties generally 
remain anonymous (Goodspeed: 2013). The exchange has certain legal responsibilities towards 
the public at large, for example: ensuring an orderly market, distributing information, 
guaranteeing the transactions on the exchange, facilitating clearing and settlement of transactions 
and protecting the interests of investors (Goodspeed: 2013).  In May 2014 the JSE installed co-
location servers and this paper examines the effect this event has had on market quality i.e. 
liquidity and volatility. The JSE lists approximately 400 companies on its Main Board and 
Alternative Exchange (AltX) and is well known for its world-class regulation, its access to deep 
pools of capital and the high participation of foreign investors. Today, the JSE is one of the top 
20 stock exchanges in terms of market capitalisation and considered to be a gateway to investing 
in quality listed African companies. The JSE currently acts as the frontline regulator, setting 
listings requirements and enforcing trading rules. The Financial Services Board (FSB) supervises 
the JSE in the commission of its regulatory duties and processes any cases where legislation has 
been contravened (Goodspeed: 2013). The FSB therefore oversees all trading that takes place on 
the exchange.   
1.2 Effect of Technology on Financial Markets 
The advancement of technology has resulted in co-location which has enabled High Frequency 
Trading (HFT) to take place. Before the advent of technology, most market makers were humans 
who were usually found on the trading floor of an exchange. Now computerized systems match 
buy and sell orders according to demand and supply. In the past people interested in purchasing 
securities would have to phone a broker or arrange to have a consultation. Now all prices are 
readily accessible and spreads are calculated on a per second basis according to factors such as 
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risk and liquidity. It has given rise to high frequency Traders. “High frequency traders are 
professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity that engage in strategies that generate a large 
number of trades on daily basis” (Securities Exchange Commission: 2010). High frequency 
traders (HFTs) use co-location services and individual data feeds offered by exchanges and 
others to minimize network and other types of latencies. HFT is often characterized by the use of 
extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer programs for generating, routing, and 
executing orders. There are very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions 
which are also cancelled shortly after submission. Usually they end the trading day in as close to 
a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying significant, unhedged positions over-night). These 
firms make investments in computer hardware and refine their computer algorithms in order to 
minimize latency, make quicker trading decisions, and transmit the resulting order messages 
back to the trading venue. It is important for HFT to locate its computers close to trading venue 
servers to increase connection speed. Electronic trading venues offer space to HFTs in their data 
centers, and use of these co-location services is characteristic of HFT. Boehmer, Fong, and Wu 
(2012) examine international evidence on electronic message traffic and market quality across 39 
stock exchanges from 2001-2009. They found that co-location increases algorithmic trading and 
high frequency trading. The introduction of co-location also improves liquidity and the 
informational efficiency of prices. 
1.3 South African Context 
The JSE rents space for servers at its primary site in Sandton. A JSE securities company, which 
is a JSE member, will rent the server space from JSE. Co-location will provide the fastest access 
to all JSE markets. Average round-trip co-location network latency will be no more than 100 
microseconds. The JSE will measure, monitor and report on co-location network latency and 
provide this information to co-location customers (Johannesburg Stock Exchange: 2013). 
Hosting Units will be allocated on a first come first served basis within a limited capacity 
constraint in the co-location facility. Once the available hosting units in the co-location facility 
have been rented by customers, there will be no further opportunity for any additional units to be 
made available. All cables between the hosting units and the co-location network switches will 
be of equal length, irrespective of the position within the co-location facility. There will be 
facility environment monitoring which will be performed by the JSE all day (Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange: 2013). The JSE will provide a facility within the primary data centre which will 
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enable telecommunication service providers to make their telecommunication services available 
to customers.  
 
Figure 1.1 Roundtrip Network Latency of the JSE in 2013.  
As noted by Jones (2014), the main reason for the JSE wanting to co-locate is that, “faster 
trading has measurable beneficial impacts on a variety of core market quality metrics including 
tighter spreads, increased liquidity and more efficient price formation, amongst others, for JSE 
clients.” The JSE's co-location centre levels the latency playing field for members especially 
those located geographically far away from the exchange. It has been built on lessons learnt from 
other markets such as NASDAQ OMX and London Stock Exchange (LSE) among others. It was 
clear to the JSE that in order to remain a world-class and relevant exchange in a highly 
competitive industry, it had to remain abreast of technological advances (Pickworth: 2013). 
Clients demand faster execution speeds and exchanges need to offer these in order to compete. 
Most of the demand for higher speeds was by United Kingdom (UK)-based firms, but local 
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software providers and data vendors were also keen on the benefits of co-location, such as less 
bandwidth costs and reduced reliance on network service providers (Williams: 2014). Credit 
Suisse Securities Johannesburg, Fixnetix, Iress Financial Markets, Peregrine Equities and 
SunGard Financial Systems were among the first to sign up. The JSE makes money from the 
volume of transactions, so high frequency traders are good for business. Algorithms buy and sell 
faster than a blink, boosting overall trading volumes. Higher volumes, in turn, help attract 
investors, creating a virtuous circle that benefits the exchanges. 
1.4 Crashes Caused by High Frequency Trading 
Some of the times, the technology has had negative influences on the market and disrupted 
trading activities. The following are examples of crashes that have occurred.  
1. Knight Capital Group 
It is one of the largest market-makers in U.S. equities. Executes orders from retail investors as 
per arrangement, with many brokerage firms in the USA. On August 1, 2012, Knight Capital 
introduced a new trading algorithm that was implemented without sufficient testing (Kirilenko et 
al., 2014). The group incurred losses of $440 million as a result of the rogue algorithm  
 
2. The Facebook IPO 
NASDAQ had serious computer problems during the debut of Facebook shares. These problems 
appeared to be the result of computer software that was incapable of handling the pace of order 
submissions and cancellations by humans and computer algorithms. This cost investors and their 
broker-dealers tens of millions of dollars, of which NASDAQ is still sorting out compensation. 
1.5 Events since Co-location 
When the JSE launched its co-location centre in May 2014, it accounted for about 5% of equity 
activity. In October 2014, co-location activity had accounted for 18%-20% of the JSE’s equity 
trading. There was a record in the same month, with daily average volume reaching close to 
400,000 (Jones: 2015). Stock transactions also rose 19 percent at the exchange in 2014. This 
shows that HFT has already had an impact on the equity market since co-location took place. 
This paper examines whether this increase in trading volume has in fact been beneficial to 
market quality factors such as volatility and liquidity. 
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Chapter 2:  Empirical Literature on High Frequency Trading 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts by explaining how a stock exchange works and the characteristics that make 
a good stock market. It then gives a brief description of the trading process. In order to critically 
understand high frequency trading it is important to first discuss the Microstructure of the 
Equity Market and Order-flow. The second section of the chapter explains these concepts. The 
final part of the chapter focuses on the literature regarding HFT and Co-location. 
A stock exchange is defined as a place –physical or virtual –where buyers and sellers (the users 
or members of the exchange) can meet and trade under rules that are mandated by a regulator 
such as the Financial Services Board (FSB) in South Africa, the Securities Exchange 
Commission in the United States and the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom 
(Goodspeed: 2013). In general a good stock market should have timely and accurate price and 
volume information on past share transactions as well as prevailing supply and demand for 
shares. Liquidity should also be present. It is the degree to which a share can be quickly and 
cheaply turned into cash. Liquidity requires marketability, which is a share’s ability to be sold 
quickly. Prices are not supposed to change from one transaction to another in the absence of 
substantial new information. A stock exchange must exhibit the ability to absorb large trade 
volumes without a significant impact on prices. In a good exchange, transaction costs as a 
percentage of the value of the trade are low and share prices adapt quickly to new information so 
that current market prices are fair in that they reflect all available information on the share. Co-
location can only take place over an exchange and for this reason the research will focus on 
shares traded on an exchange. South Africa has one National Stock Exchange which is the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Stock exchanges tend to be either order or quote-driven.  
In an order-driven market, buyers and sellers submit bid and ask prices of a particular share to a 
central location where the orders are matched by a broker. The JSE Ltd and most US securities 
exchanges are order-driven.  In a quote-driven market, individual dealers act as market makers 
by buying and selling shares for themselves. NASDAQ is a quote-driven market. 
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
 South Africa 
National exchange 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE Ltd) 
Turnover (%) (2011) 
42.1 
Listed companies  
395 
Market capitalization (USD billion end 2011) 
789.1 
Broad stock market index 
FTSE/JSE All share index 
Trading system 
Order and quote driven 
Trading methodology Continuous 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges, 2011 Annual Report 
2.1.2 JSE Trading Process 
Most trading in shares is intermediated by brokers, dealers or broker-dealers, which are 
members of the exchange and trade on behalf of their clients. The trading process is shown in 
figure 2.2 below. 
Figure 2.2 Trading Process 
 
 
 
          Broker 
 
              
           Dealer/Trader 
Trade     Trade  
 
   Clients 
Market data 
e.g., Reuters, 
Bloomberg 
Orders to 
buy/sell 
Orders to 
buy/sell 
Dark Pools Exchange        
JSE Ltd 
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The JSE has an automated trading system. Client orders are entered to the trading system by the 
clients’ appointed JSE or broker members-dealers. The orders are stored by brokers in the 
central order book, which is anonymous so that JSE members do not know the identity of their 
counterparts. 
2.2 Microstructure of Equity Market 
Microstructure analysis is designed to yield insights into the effect of market design (structure 
and regulation) on market performance. “Equity market microstructure addresses issues that 
involve the placement and handling of orders in a securities market, and their translation into 
trades and transaction prices in a marketplace” (Brogaard: 2012). Microstructure models 
recognize that some information relevant to share prices is not publicly available. It recognizes 
that market participants differ in ways that affect prices and that trading mechanisms differ in 
ways that affect prices (Lyons: 2005). Microstructure studies have facilitated the development of 
trading strategies and algorithms for asset managers and broker/dealer intermediaries and this 
has been evident in the current development of computer driven algorithmic trading. Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis (EMH) was widely accepted by financial economists as a hallmark of 
modern portfolio theory. According to (Fama: 1991), “A market is informationally efficient if no 
participant is able to achieve excess risk adjusted returns by trading on currently available 
information.” Many of the EMH tests have considered one major part of the information set – 
market information (e.g., recent quotes, trading volume, and transaction prices). If prices 
properly reflect all known information, then they must change randomly over time; hence the 
term “random walk” (Schwartz: 2004). Earlier studies, based on daily data, generally supported 
the random walk hypothesis. However, with the advent of records of all trades and quotes, 
correlation patterns have been detected. This observation, along with superior knowledge of the 
impact of trading costs on returns behavior, is casting a new light on market efficiency. 
Microstructure analysis sheds light on how new information is incorporated into security prices. 
In a zero cost environment, share values would be continuously and instantaneously updated 
with the release of new information. In actual markets, however, information must be received 
and assessed, traders’ orders must be placed and processed, and executions must be delivered 
and accounts cleared and settled. Costs, both explicit (e.g., commissions) and implicit (e.g., 
market impact), are incurred throughout this chain of events. Highlighted in much microstructure 
literature are the costs that some participants incur when, in an asymmetric information 
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environment, other participants receive information first and trade on it to the disadvantage of 
the uninformed. Asymmetric information is not the only reality, however. In light of the size, 
complexity, and imprecision of much publicly available information, one might expect that 
investors in possession of the same information set will form different expectations about future 
risk and return configurations (Schwartz: 2004). This situation is referred to as “divergent 
expectations.” Asymmetric information and divergent expectations together reflect a rich set of 
forces that impact the dynamic behavior of security prices. Participant orders cannot be 
translated into trades at zero cost (markets are not perfectly liquid), and trades typically are not 
made at market clearing (i.e., equilibrium) prices. Trading decision rules (algorithms) are needed 
because the costs of implementing portfolio decisions can sharply lower portfolio performance 
(Hasbrouck: 2002). In fact, much algorithmic trading is designed to control trading costs, rather 
than to exploit profitable trading opportunities. 
 
2.2.1Price discovery and Quantity Discovery 
Price discovery refers to participants collectively searching for equilibrium prices and quantity 
discovery refers to the difficulty that participants who would be willing to trade with each other 
actually have finding each other and trading when markets are fragmented (Biondi: 2010). This 
difficulty is accentuated because some participants (primarily institutional investors) do not 
immediately reveal the total size of their orders (doing so would unduly drive up their market 
impact costs). The link between market structure and price discovery depends on the 
environment within which participants are operating. At one end of the spectrum, investors can 
be equally informed and form homogeneous expectations based on the information. At the other 
end, they can be differentially informed and form divergent expectations with regard to 
commonly shared information. “When investors are not equally informed, and when they form 
different expectations based on common information, prices must be discovered in the 
marketplace and the exchange provides this economic service” (Biondi: 2010). 
Regarding quantity discovery, handling the orders of large institutional customers is a 
challenge. It is not at all uncommon for an institution to want to buy or to sell shares of a 
company that exceed the average daily trading volume. Executing an order of this size can 
easily drive prices away from the trader before the job has been completed. The adverse price 
move is a market impact cost. Institutions attempt to control their market impact costs by 
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trading patiently and, as much as possible, invisibly. To this end, a number of alternative 
trading systems (ATSs) have been formed in recent years, and dark (i.e., non-transparent) 
liquidity pools have emerged. Trading is driven by informational change, liquidity needs, and 
noise trading and the information motive for trading is the first mover of the three. All 
participants in possession of the same information form equivalent expectations concerning 
future risk and return configurations. When information changes, however, participants may not 
all receive the news at the same time dividing traders into two groups – the informed and the 
uninformed. Informed participants will never trade with each other and consequently, liquidity 
and noise traders must be present for a market to function (Schwartz: 2004). The hallmark of 
the microstructure approach is order-flow. This will now be discussed in detail. 
 
2.2.2 Order-flow 
Order flow is transaction volume that is signed. Order-flow measures actual transactions, where 
each transaction is signed positively or negatively depending on whether the initiator of the 
transaction is buying or selling (Lyons: 2002). Order-flow conveys information about 
fundamentals because it contains the trades of those who analyse fundamentals. It gives the idea 
that prices go up when there are more buyers than sellers. In this sense, it is a transmission 
mechanism. For example; Fig 2.3, shows information processing has two stages. The first stage 
is the analysis or observation of fundamentals by non-dealer market participants (mutual funds, 
hedge funds, individuals with special information, etc.). The second stage is the dealer's 
interpretation of the first-stage analysis. The dealer's interpretation comes from reading the 
order-flow. Dealers then set price on the basis of this interpretation. 
  
        Stage 1                                                           Stage 2 
 
 
 
 Order-flow  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Two stages of information processing 
 
 
The dealer's dependence on learning from order flow arises in these models because the 
Non dealers learn 
about fundamentals 
from direct sources 
Dealers learn about 
fundamentals from 
direct sources 
    Price 
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information being learned is not publicly known. When information is publicly known, dealers 
do not need to learn from order flow. In practice, though some information relevant to shares is 
publicly known, some is not, so learning from order flow can be important. “Order-flow in 
equity markets is persistent in the sense that orders to buy tend to be followed by more orders to 
buy and orders to sell tend to be followed by more orders to sell” (Lyons: 2002). Positive serial 
autocorrelation of signed order-flow has been observed in many different markets. Positive 
autocorrelation was observed in the Paris Bourse by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), in foreign 
exchange markets by Danielsson and Payne (2012), and in the NYSE by Ellul (2007). Two 
important concepts in order-flow are order splitting and order herding. Order splitting occurs 
when single investors split desired large trades into smaller pieces and execute them gradually. 
The strategic motivations for order splitting were originally derived by Kyle (1985), who showed 
that an informed trader with a monopoly on private information would trade gradually in order to 
reduce impact. Herding occurs when investors imitate others or act together in response to a 
signal such as a press release or price change. There are many strategic reasons why agents 
might herd, including reputational considerations, delayed response to public information or 
slow diffusion of private information (Zhang: 2012). Lee and Subrahmanyam (2004), studied 
daily autocorrelations in order-flow imbalances on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. They found that 
splitting and herding influence the observed persistent autocorrelation of order-flow to a great 
extent.  
 
2.3 High Frequency Trading and Co-location 
The beneficiaries from co-location appear to be a new breed of high frequency traders who 
implement low-latency strategies, which are strategies that respond to market events in the 
millisecond environment. While estimates vary due to the difficulty in ascertaining whether a 
trade is part of High frequency trading (HFT), recent estimates suggest HFT accounts for 50-
70% of equity trades in the U.S., 40% in Canada and 35% in London (Chang, 2010; Grant, 2011; 
O’Reilly, 2012). HFT is usually characterized by a large number of orders with smaller order 
quantities and speedy cancellations that tend to have short position-holding periods with almost 
no overnight position. There are many potential benefits of HFT. The main positive is that HFT 
can intermediate trades at lower cost. Those lower costs from automation can be passed on to 
investors in the form of narrower bid-ask spreads and smaller commissions (Jones: 2013). It can 
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help ensure that related assets remain consistently priced due to increased liquidity (Chaboud et 
al., 2009). It can also help traders cope with market fragmentation by fostering competition 
between trading mechanisms, including exchanges and other platforms. Brogaard (2010) finds 
that, rather than increasing stock volatility due to more frequent trading, HFT reduces stock 
volatility. Many HFT strategies are not new. They are simply familiar trading strategies updated 
for an automated environment. For example, many HFTs make markets using the same business 
model as traditional market-makers, but with lower costs due to automation. In fact, HFT 
market-makers have largely replaced human market makers. Other HFT strategies conduct cross-
market arbitrage, such as ensuring that prices of the same share trading in both New York and 
London are the same. In the past, human traders would carry out this type of arbitrage, but the 
same trading strategy can now be implemented faster and at lower cost with computers (Jones: 
2013). 
 
“While HFT causes better market quality on average, some commentators have argued that HFT 
could make markets more fragile, increasing the possibility of extreme market moves and 
episodes of extreme illiquidity” (Kyle: 2011).The potential negative is that the speed of HFT 
could put other market participants at a disadvantage. The resulting adverse selection could 
reduce market quality. There is also the potential for an unproductive arms race among HFT 
firms racing to be fastest. Biais and Woolley (2011) also note the potential costs of HFT which 
includes manipulation in various ways, such as adverse selection and imperfect competition. 
Adverse selection can take place in the sense that non-HFT trades are slower and less well 
informed than HFT trades, thereby leading to a reduced market participation among the non-HFT 
traders (i.e., HFT trades impose a negative externality of adverse selection on non-HFT traders). 
Imperfect competition exists among HFT traders and non-HFT traders due to the large fixed 
costs of establishing high frequency trading. While the average effect of HFT on market quality 
is positive, there is substantial skewness in this kind of trading. This suggests that many firms 
either do not experience it or are subject to negative consequences. Several theoretical and 
empirical models analyse high frequency trading’s effects on market quality measures, including 
execution costs, liquidity, volatility and informational efficiency. While theoretical models 
mostly predict negative (or mixed) consequences of having fast traders in the market, the average 
effects estimated in empirical results tend to be positive.  
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High Frequency Trading Strategies 
 
Figure 2.4 High Frequency Trading Strategies 
Source: BlackRock 
 
Market-makers: Market-makers simultaneously post limit orders on both sides of the electronic 
limit order book. They provide liquidity to market participants who want to trade immediately. 
Market-makers aim to buy at the bid price and sell at the ask price, thereby earning the bid-ask 
spread. They bear the risk that they trade with, and lose money to, an informed counterparty. 
Thus, they have an incentive to make sure that their limit orders to buy and sell incorporate as 
much current information as possible, so as to limit their losses to informed counterparties 
(Jones: 2013). HFT market-makers have largely replaced traditional human market-makers, in 
part because they are less likely to be picked off by an informed counterparty, and in part 
because the use of technology results in a lower cost structure for HFT market-makers. 
Arbitrage trading: A classic example is index arbitrage. S&P 500 futures are traded in Chicago 
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, while SPY is the ticker symbol for the largest exchange-
traded fund (ETF) that tracks the S&P 500 index. The two instruments are very similar, and their 
prices should move one-for-one. If the futures price goes up due to the arrival of buy orders, but 
the ETF price does not move up at the same instant, high frequency traders would quickly buy 
SPY, sell S&P 500 futures contracts, and lock in a small profit on the price differential between 
the two instruments. Naturally, these profit opportunities require rapid computer processing 
capability and the quickest possible link between the electronic market in Chicago and the 
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electronic equity markets. 
Directional trading: Some HFT firms electronically parse news releases, apply textual analysis, 
and trade on the inferred news. These news providers sell summary measures of the news to HFT 
firms, saving the firms from having to perform their own analysis and saving them precious 
milliseconds (Zhang: 2012). Other HFT firms trade based on order flow signals and momentum. 
For example, if a large buy order executes at the prevailing ask price, a HFT strategy might infer 
that the order submitter has substantial positive information. The high frequency trader might 
then respond by buying shares itself. 
  
However, how much of the price formed constitutes the true value of a security? Is the price a 
true reflection of the company’s fundamentals? It therefore becomes an empirical question to 
determine whether these high-frequency trading algorithms in the aggregate, harm or improve 
the market quality perceived by long-term investors. 
2.3.1 Volatility 
“Volatility is the degree of variation of a trading price series over time, as measured by the 
standard deviation of returns” (Goodspeed: 2013). Volatility is important to traders and issuers. 
Greater volatility makes limit orders more costly, and may discourage some traders from 
supplying liquidity. Certain types of volatility could be desirable. For example, prices change 
faster in response to new information, and volatility could be higher, when markets are more 
efficient. It is thus conceivable that the greater efficiency that is associated with more 
Algorithmic Trading also produces higher volatility. Co-location refers to locating a trader’s 
order submission algorithm physically close to a trading center’s computer. Given that 
Algorithmic Trading improves informational efficiency, it is plausible that the elevated volatility 
associated with more algorithmic trading reflects faster price adjustments to new information. In 
this case, the higher volatility could be desirable, because it reflects new information rather than 
noise. Brogaard (2010) came up with a HFT data set. He used a unique dataset from NASDAQ 
OMX that distinguishes HFT from non-HFT quotes and trades. The NASDAQ dataset consists 
of 26 traders that have been identified as engaging primarily in high frequency trading. His 
results showed that HFTs contribute more to price discovery and reduce volatility. Hasbrouck 
and Saar (2012) explored the nature and impact of low-latency (algorithmic) trading on the 
NASDAQ exchange during June 2007, a 'nominal' market period, and October 2008, a volatile, 
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uncertain period. They identified periods of high market activity due to algorithms and relate 
these to longer-term market quality metrics such as spread, effective spread and depth of 
liquidity. They observe in both periods “that higher low-latency activity implies lower posted 
and effective spreads, greater depth, and lower short-term volatility.” Zhang (2012) reports that 
there is a positive correlation between stock price volatility and HFT, being more distinctive 
when the markets are under stress, for example, when there are rapid volatility swings or 
unexpected price fluctuations. However, he did not rule out the possibility of a sudden and 
severe market condition in which high-frequency traders contribute to a market failure. The 
experience of the “flash crash” in May of 2010 demonstrates that such fragility is certainly 
possible when a few big players step aside and nobody remains to post limit orders. Co-location 
eventually leads to the impossibility of achieving equal access in financial markets. Avramovic 
(2012) released a follow-up report for Credit Suisse on the impact of HFT on market quality and 
found that bid-ask spreads declined and depth at the inside quote increased. She also looked at 
historical long-term and short-term (intraday) volatility and found that long-term volatility has 
remained within historical norms while short-term volatility has declined over recent years. The 
conclusion was that, with regard to high frequency traders, “markets are not worse for their 
presence”. Chaboud et al. (2009) used a dataset that separately identified computer generated 
trades from human generated trades and showed that an increase in automated trading may be 
associated with less market volatility, and that automated traders tend to increase liquidity 
provision after exogenous market events such as macroeconomic data announcements. 
2.3.2 Liquidity 
Liquidity is an important, desirable feature of financial markets. Some researchers have raised 
the concern that the liquidity provided by HFTs may be illusory. “Since HFTs have no 
affirmative obligation to provide liquidity, their trading is opportunistic in nature, and the 
liquidity they create may disappear quickly when it is most needed on the market” (O’hara: 
2011). For example, Kirilenko et al. (2014) documents that during the Flash Crash of May 6, 
2010, many HFT traders withdrew from the market while others turned into liquidity demanders. 
Using data from Toronto Stock Exchange, Korajczyk and Murphy (2015) found that HFTs 
initially trade against institutional investors' large orders and quickly turn to competing with 
them by trading in the same direction later. They also report that HFTs reduce liquidity provision 
when institutional trades are too large. Initial expectation is that HFT facilitates the entry of 
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additional liquidity suppliers thereby increasing competition. Hendershot et al. (2011) 
investigated the empirical relationship between high frequency trading and liquidity. They used a 
normalized measure of NYSE electronic message traffic as a proxy for HFT which included 
electronic order submissions, cancellations, and trade reports. It was found that for large-cap 
stocks, an increase in algorithmic liquidity supply narrows both the quoted and effective spread. 
The same increase in algorithmic trading had no great impact on small cap stocks. It could be the 
case that algorithms are less commonly used in these smaller stocks, so high frequency trading 
has little effect on these stocks’ market quality. Jarnecic and Snape (2010) used data provided by 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The authors used a similar regression framework as 
Brogaard in order to isolate the impact of HFT on various market metrics. They found that HFT 
participants tend to provide liquidity when spreads are wide, demand liquidity when spreads are 
narrow, that they are more likely to "smooth” out liquidity over time and are unlikely to 
exacerbate stock price volatility. Lepone (2011) summarized the results of a series of research 
conducted by the Australian organization, Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre 
(CMCRC). These papers examined the impact of HFT on market quality for exchanges based in 
Singapore, Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Their data allowed 
them to identify trading participants and classify them into HFT and non-HFT groups. Following 
a methodology similar to Brogaard (2010), each of these papers measured the impact of HFT on 
market quality metrics. The findings showed a consistent pattern of improved market quality 
coinciding with growing HFT participation. They also demonstrated that HFT is active during all 
volatility conditions and “become the primary providers of liquidity” in periods of high 
uncertainty. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2011) reported on how a 2007 upgrade to the Deutsche 
Bourse’s Xetra trading system focused solely on latency reduction, positively affected market 
quality. After latency reductions in the exchange’s trading systems, liquidity increased across 
market capitalization and trade sizes, and adverse selection and permanent price impact were 
dramatically reduced. Brogaard et al. (2013) showed that the optional speed upgrade at 
NASDAQ OMX in September 2012 was associated with improved liquidity and that the 
improvements benefited both fast and slow traders. Malinova, Park and Riodan (2013) also 
found that high frequency trading significantly lowers spreads and reduces trading costs for non 
HFT traders. 
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2.3.3 Price Manipulation less during HFT 
The beneficial role of high frequency traders in price discovery is consistent with theoretical 
models of informed trading, e.g., Kyle (1985). In these models informed traders go against 
transitory pricing errors and trade in the direction of permanent price changes. HFTs predict 
price changes occurring a few seconds in the future. The short-lived nature of HFTs’ information 
raises questions about whether the informational efficiency gains outweigh the direct and indirect 
adverse selection costs imposed on non-HFTs. Some institutional investors have expressed 
serious concerns that HFTs may adversely impact their trading profits. There is a view that high 
frequency traders are the modern-day version of market makers with highly engineered computer 
systems. If technology expedites the execution of trades and/or improves the efficiency of market 
making, HFT should benefit other market participants, including institutional investors. Some 
commentators have expressed concern that high frequency trading might increase the prevalence 
of market manipulation (Biasis and Woolley: 2011). High frequency trading, by virtue of the 
speed of entering orders and execution of transactions, has the potential scope for facilitating 
manipulation more easily in a number of ways. Firstly, HFT can be used to enter purchase orders 
at successively higher prices to create the appearance of active interest in a security, which is 
also termed as ramping/gouging. Another example is giving up priority, which refers to deleting 
orders on one side of the market as they approach priority and then entering the order again on 
the same side of the market. Cummings et al. (2012) directly examined the link between HFT 
and one very important and specific form of manipulation: end-of-day price dislocation using 
‘closing’ or ‘end-of-day’ [EOD] prices. They examined closing price manipulation from 22 stock 
exchanges around the world from January 2003 – June 2011 and noted when there were unusual 
changes in market trading patterns over the period. Overall, their findings implied that High 
frequency trading makes it more difficult for market manipulators to manipulate EOD closing 
prices. Frino and Lepone (2012) looked at HFT trading on the LSE and Euronext Paris to study 
whether HFT participates in manipulative behavior. Using message traffic as a proxy for HFT, 
and using two different proxy measures for market manipulation, “Dislocation Price Alerts” and 
“Ticking”, the authors found no link between HFT activity and market manipulation. 
Specifically, the authors found a negative relationship between HFT activity and Dislocation 
Price Alerts (implying that HFT actively reduces these events) and no statistical relationship 
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between HFT activity and Ticking. If HFTs are indeed better informed due to their speed in 
processing information, there is also an upside, because their trading contributes to price 
discovery. Stock prices are more efficient because they reflect information more quickly, and 
this can be valuable to all investors. For example, as discussed earlier index arbitrage activity by 
HFT ensures that the price of a basket of stocks reflects the prices of the underlying stocks. An 
investor who wants to hold a broad market index such as the S&P 500 can purchase SPY (the 
biggest ETF that tracks the S&P 500) secure in the knowledge that the price of the ETF closely 
reflects the trading price of the underlying stocks. This suggests that the price discovery due to 
HFT and other arbitrageurs is quite valuable to investors. End of day price manipulation is not as 
pronounced under HFT as current regulatory concerns might suggest. This is counter to recent 
concerns expressed in the media. However this does not rule out the fact that HFT can lead to 
other forms of manipulation.  
 
2.3.4 Systematic Return Risk and Liquidity Risk 
There is scarce evidence on HFT’s direct effect on systematic risk which is the non diversifiable 
part of every stock’s total risk. Laube and Malcenieks (2013) were the first to examine this 
relationship. They investigated whether during the time period of 2007-2009, European equity 
markets experienced a change in systematic risk due to high frequency trading activity, which 
was measured by looking at the change in commonality in stock returns (systematic return risk) 
and commonality in liquidity (systematic liquidity risk). High frequency traders contribute to 
systematic risk. When High Frequency Traders operate in high volumes, non-high frequency 
traders may misinterpret these signals, and this can cause speculative trading. Also market 
overreaction to news can take place when HFTs are actively participating. Trading algorithms 
also have a possibility to contain small errors, which can lead to chaos in the market. Donefer et 
al. (2011) carried out a regression on a sample of stocks from different exchanges. The results 
from their regression for the whole sample suggested that an increase in HFT leads to a rise in 
both commonality in stock returns and liquidity. Their conclusion showed that countries that 
displayed the highest commonality in returns were also among those with the greatest 
commonality in liquidity (Sweden, UK, Germany, Spain, and France), confirming that most 
active markets with co-location facilities have higher systematic return and liquidity risk.  
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“Based on the vast majority of the empirical work to date, HFT, automated trading and 
competing trading venues have substantially improved market liquidity and reduced trading costs 
for all investors” (Jones: 2013). Share prices are almost surely higher as a result of this reduction 
in trading costs, benefiting long-term investors. Higher share prices also have favorable 
implications for firms’ cost of equity capital. With a lower cost of capital, firms are likely to 
invest more, with likely increases in the gross domestic product (GDP) and other measures of 
economic activity. In specific terms, HFT has sharply increased competition in market making, 
and bid-ask spreads are much narrower as a result. Stock prices are more efficient as a result of 
HFT activity. Overall, there is no evidence of any adverse effect due to HFT in the average 
results. Perhaps the only concern supported by the data is that HFT may not help to stabilize 
prices during unusually volatile periods. 
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Chapter 3: Empirical Evidence on Co-location in the JSE  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the effect co-location has had on the JSE since the launch of the co-
location facility on May 14 2014. The first section in this chapter tries to identify the impact of 
co-location on the JSE Equity Market by comparing the change in volatility, before and after co-
location, in the three main indices which are the All Share Index, Top 40 Index (Top 40) and 
Financial Index (FINX). Price data is taken from Bloomberg over the period November 2013 to 
May 2015. Summary statistics are then depicted before and after co-location to test whether 
volatility actually increased. The second section identifies the impact co-location has had on 
liquidity. Data is taken monthly from the JSE Market statistics and statistical summary statistics 
are undertaken in Gretl using one lag difference. The third section identifies factors affecting co-
location trades which are liquidity, volatility, interest rate and exchange rate. A regression is then 
run to see the correlation between co-location trades and each of those factors. Lastly the 
significant variables are then taken as the dependent variables and a regression is done to 
determine effect of co-location trades on the significant variables. 
 
Other empirical studies which have been done include Hagströmer and Norden (2012), who used 
data from NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm containing a sample of 120 randomly selected stocks 
from 2008 to 2009. It was found that HFT’s are responsible for roughly 42% of trading volume 
in large stocks and 18% in small stocks. These numbers show that HFT is concentrated in large 
liquid stocks and less in small less liquid stocks. One reason is that HFTs value the ability to exit 
positions quickly, making more frequently traded stocks more attractive. Another reason might 
be narrower bid-ask spreads in large stocks facilitating liquidity. In this paper co-location is 
regarded as the event that infers high frequency trading, as is the case with similar studies on the 
topic .Volatility is tested only on the large liquid stocks which make up the three main indices. In 
this case the co-location go live date is 14 May 2014.  
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3.2 Volatility 
“Volatility is the degree of variation of a trading price series over time, as measured by the 
standard deviation of returns” (Goodspeed: 2013). Simply, volatility is the up-and-down 
movement of the market. Volatility obtained before co-location is compared to volatility after co-
location in order to compare the two periods. Co-location is associated with high frequency 
trading which can lead to great price volatility. By comparing the volatility before and after, we 
are able to see whether there was a significant change in the volatility rather than taking it all as 
one period. The descriptive statistics show the mean, median, minimum and maximum values, 
and the standard deviation values just to name a few. Volatility is important for market 
participants and regulators. Market tends to fluctuate more and by a larger extent during more 
volatile periods. In general normal traders base their strategies on buying the stocks of 
fundamentally strong companies. Higher volatility means more risks because prices are unstable. 
This risk causes market makers to widen their bid/ask spreads, increasing the cost of trading for 
both institutional and retail traders whose risk management techniques will need to be adjusted 
based on changes in volatility (Brogaard: 2013). However some short term traders prefer 
volatility because it presents them with more profitable opportunities. For high frequency traders, 
some trading algorithms work only with low volatility while others need high volatility. 
Regulators and the government will prefer volatility on the exchange to be low because the 
market will be more stable and this attracts more investors. It is important to understand how 
volatility reacts to co-location because it is a factor that will have a large effect on the rest of the 
market.  
Using Gretl statistical software, summary statistics before co-location are obtained for the three 
main indices which are All Share Index, Top 40 Index and Financial Index. The volatility is 
obtained from the standard deviation value in the summary statistics table. Volatility before co-
location for the All Share Index, Top 40 and FINX respectively is 0.0069, 0.0075 and 0.0075 
respectively. The average volatility is thus 0.0073. 
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Table 3.1 Before Co-location 
Summary Statistics, using the observations 2013-11-04 - 2014-05-11 [Closing Prices] 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 After Co-location 
Summary Statistics, using the observations 2014-05-14- 2015-11-05 [Closing Prices] 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
ld_All Share -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0219 0.0316 
ld_TOP40 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0236 0.0354 
ld_FINX -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0197 0.0216 
 
Variable 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
C.V. 
 
Skewness 
 
Ex. kurtosis 
ld_All Share 0.0087 26.8416 0.4479 1.5412 
ld_TOP40 0.0096 19.2954 0.5289 1.5734 
ld_FINX 0.0089 21.1835 0.2594 -0.1376 
 
Variable 
 
5% Perc. 
 
95% Perc. 
 
IQ range 
 
Missing obs. 
ld_All Share -0.0143 0.0168 0.0106 1 
ld_TOP40 -0.0168 0.0179 0.0119 1 
ld_FINX -0.0145 0.0166 0.0118 1 
 
 
After co-location during the period from May 2014 to May 2015, volatility for the All Share 
Index, Top 40 and FINX respectively is 0.0088, 0.0096 and 0.0089 respectively. The average 
volatility increases from 0.0073 to 0.0091. For all indices there is an increase with the biggest 
change coming in the Top 40 Index. Hasbrouck and Saar (2012) utilized publicly-available 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
ld_All Share 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0270 0.0181 
ld_TOP_40_ 0.0008 0.0013 -0.0297 0.0199 
ld_FINX -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0252 0.0241 
 
Variable 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
C.V. 
 
Skewness 
 
Ex. kurtosis 
ld_All Share 0.0069 9.6859 -0.4961 0.7410 
ld_TOP_40_ 0.0075 10.0411 -0.5136 0.8302 
ld_FINX 0.0075 6.7053 -0.0304 0.9896 
 
Variable 
 
5% Perc. 
 
95% Perc. 
 
IQ range 
 
Missing obs. 
ld_All Share -0.0107 0.0111 0.0097 1 
ld_TOP_40_ -0.0119 0.0119 0.0104 1 
ld_FINX -0.0138 0.0117 0.0092 1 
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NASDAQ order level data and developed measures that allowed them to characterize the 
influence of high frequency trading on liquidity and short-term volatility .They found HFT was 
negatively correlated with short-term volatility, meaning  volatility decreased with an increase in 
HFT which was positive for the markets. Brogaard (2010) in his study also found that intraday 
volatility was significantly reduced. Groth (2011) found that HFT does not significantly increase 
volatility. In our case the volatility has increased which is bad for the market. This is in contrast 
to most empirical studies which have shown the opposite effect.  One reason might be that HFT 
traders are not yet fully present in the market to bring about the changes experienced in other 
markets. Secondly, other exchanges such as NYSE, LSE etc are more developed. The last reason 
might be that there is no real correlation between volatility and high frequency trading. Chaboud, 
Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009) in their study found no casual relationship between 
HFT and volatility.  
3.3 Liquidity 
“Liquidity describes the degree to which an asset or security can be quickly bought or sold in the 
market without affecting the asset's price” (Goodspeed: 2013). If an exchange has a high volume 
of trade the price a buyer offers per share (the bid price) and the price the seller is willing to 
accept (the ask price) will be fairly close to each other. Investors, then, will not have to give up 
unrealized gains for a quick sale. When the spread between the bid and ask prices grows, the 
market becomes more illiquid. Liquidity data is obtained monthly from the JSE Market statistics. 
In our study, liquidity obtained before co-location is compared to liquidity after co-location in 
order to compare the two periods. Co-location is associated with high frequency trading which 
can lead to greater liquidity as a result of the HFTs acting as market makers. By comparing the 
liquidity before and after, we are able to see whether there was a significant change in the 
liquidity rather than taking it all as one period. Liquidity is important for market participants and 
regulators. The liquidity and corporate finance literature provides abundant evidence that 
liquidity is beneficial in many corporate settings. “It  facilitates the entrance of informed traders, 
enhances the effectiveness of equity-based compensation to managers, reduces the cost of equity 
financing, mitigates trading frictions investors encounter when trading and lowers the immediate 
transaction costs for firms conducting large share repurchases” (Brogaard: 2013). High liquidity 
makes it easier for traders and companies to sell shares easily. The market will also be more 
attractive to investors who will know they can easily leave the market when things go south or 
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when they have made profit. Regulators will want an environment where liquidity is high so that 
transactions can easily be conducted. A bad situation is one where the share price rarely moves 
and there are few buyers and sellers. This will mean the price can be manipulated with large 
orders by traders who want to move the share price in a specific direction. It is important to 
understand how liquidity is affected by co-location because other potential investors and 
companies might want to invest on the JSE and they will want to know how easily they can close 
out their positions on the market.   
Summary statistics were obtained from Gretl before and after co-location to assess impact of co-
location.   
Table 3.3 Before Co-location 
Summary Statistics, using the observations Nov-2013–May 2014 [Monthly Liquidity] 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Liquidity 0.0029 0.0027 -0.2403 0.03338 
 
Variable 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
C.V. 
 
Skewness 
 
Ex. kurtosis 
Liquidity 0.2239 76.0105 0.4474 -0.9848 
 
Variable 
 
5% Perc. 
 
95% Perc. 
 
IQ range 
 
Missing obs. 
Liquidity undefined undefined 0.4055 0 
                                                     
 The mean liquidity before co-location was 0.0029 using first log difference. 
 
 
Table 3.4 After Co-location 
Summary Statistics, using the observations May 2014– May 2015 [Monthly Liquidity] 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Liquidity 0.0171 -0.0457 -0.3380 0.4727 
 
Variable 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
C.V. 
 
Skewness 
 
Ex. kurtosis 
Liquidity 0.2058 12.0186 0.8039 0.7325 
 
Variable 
 
5% Perc. 
 
95% Perc. 
 
IQ range 
 
Missing obs. 
Liquidity undefined undefined 0.1183 0 
 
After co-location the mean liquidity increased to 0.0171 using first log difference. Hendershot et 
al. (2011) investigated the empirical relationship between HFT and liquidity. They developed a 
time-series evolution of HFT and liquidity for a sample of NYSE stocks over the five years from 
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February 2001 through December 2005.It was found that for large-cap stocks, an increase in 
algorithmic trading narrows both the quoted and effective spread by 0.53 basis points and had no 
great impact on small cap stocks. This means high frequency trading was positively correlated 
with liquidity. Brogaard et al. (2013) showed that the optional speed upgrade at NASDAQ OMX 
in September 2012 was associated with improved liquidity and that the improvements benefited 
both fast and slow traders. This study closely resembles that paper as they also used an event to 
incur high frequency trading and the result in this paper of increased liquidity is similar to 
Brogaard and other empirical studies done. This is good news for traders and regulators as it 
means shares can be bought and sold more easily. Malinova, Park and Riodan (2013) found that 
HFT significantly lowers spreads and reduces trading costs for non HFT traders. The increase in 
liquidity in our study should be taken as positive for the JSE market.   
3.4 Regression 
In order to see the effect of co-location we run a regression to see whether co-location is 
correlated with liquidity and volatility. There are two other factors identified which can also 
impact co-location which are the interest rate and exchange rate. Lastly a dummy variable is 
included in the regression to see the effects of the policy changes which were in the form of 
interest rate rises by the central bank between July 2014 and November 2015. Volatility is 
calculated from the JSE Top 40 Index. This is because as stated before, HFT is concentrated in 
large liquid stocks and less in small less liquid stocks. The Top 40 Index represents the 40 largest 
companies by capitalization and I believe these are the stocks mostly affected by co-location. 
Daily closing prices and returns for the Top 40 Index are taken from July 2014 to November 
2015 and the prices and returns are used to compute the standard deviation. This is then 
multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days in that month to obtain the monthly 
standardized volatility. The log differences of Trades, liquidity and volatility are obtained from 
Gretl and we see from the diagram below that Trades and liquidity seem to be closely related. 
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Fig 3.1 Log differences of Trades, liquidity and volatility. Courtesy of Gretl. 
The log differences of the other two factors which are interest rate and exchange rate are 
obtained and we see from the diagram below that trades and the exchange rate seem to be closely 
correlated. Interest rate was constant throughout much of 2014 but we see that after the rate hike 
in July 2015, trades went down and only started to rise in October 2015. 
Fig 3.2 Log differences of Trades, Interest Rate and Exchange Rate. Courtesy of Gretl. 
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3.4.1 Results of Regression 
 
              Table 3.5 Results of Regression                                                                     
Summary Statistics: 2014:07-2015:11 (T = 17) Dependent variable: Trades 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 889990 4.92645e+06 0.1807 0.85992  
Liquidity 3.88797e+06 1.33069e+06 2.9218 0.01389 ** 
Volatility 1.13722e+07 3.18187e+06 3.5741 0.00436 *** 
Interest_Rate -1.39228e+08 1.10786e+08 -1.2567 0.23488  
Exchange_Rate 630642 155863 4.0461 0.00193 *** 
DummyPolicyChange 61277.7 203758 0.3007 0.76922  
 
Mean dependent var                      2416334 S.D. dependent var                      755432.0 
Sum squared resid  5.08e+11 S.E. of regression  214855.5 
R-squared  0.944387 Adjusted R-squared  0.919109 
F(5, 11)  37.35921 P-value(F)  1.54e-06 
Log-likelihood -229.1430 Akaike criterion  470.2860 
Schwarz criterion  475.2853 Hannan-Quinn  470.7830 
rho -0.396281 Durbin-Watson  2.531399 
 
If we wanted to predict the number of co-location trades we would use the equation: 
Trades = 889990 + (3.88797e+06*Liquidity) + (1.13722e+07*Volatility) + (-
1.39228e+08*Interest Rate) + (630642 * Exchange_Rate)  
Statistical significance is very important. This is shown by the stars or asterisks to the far right 
for each variable. Three stars is the “best”, two is “good”, and one is just “okay”. If there are no 
stars, the variable is said to be insignificant. These stars/asterisks are based on the number in the 
column titled “p-value”. This is the probability value for the statistical test. A p-value of 1% 
(0.01) or lower gives three stars, a p-value greater than 1% (0.01) but less than 5% (0.05)gives 
two stars, and a p-value greater than 5% (0.05) but less than 10% (0.10) gives one star. If the p-
value is higher than 10% (0.10) the variable is said to be “insignificant”. We see that interest rate 
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and DummyPolicyChange are the only insignificant variables. Volatility and exchange rate are 
the most significant, with liquidity lower but still giving a good significance. As stated earlier in 
the chapter, it is unclear whether volatility is positively or negatively correlated with co-location 
trades. This is because some strategies require high volatility while others will work with low 
volatility. From Fig 3.1 we can clearly see that volatility tends to have its own path.  The 
exchange rate is positively related to co-location trades. The higher nominal exchange rate means 
that foreign currencies will appreciate in relation to the rand and this will mean investors will 
find it cheaper to invest in shares. Lastly liquidity is positively related with co-location trades 
because investors and traders find high liquidity more attractive. It is easier to buy and sell and 
strategies can be implemented at lower costs.  
The R-squared tells us how good the model is at fitting the data. In this case it is high at 0.94439. 
This means that liquidity, volatility, exchange rate, interest rate and the dummy variable predicts 
about 94.4% of the variation in the number of trades. Now we want to know individually, how 
the co-location trades affect liquidity and volatility. To do this we run a regression of co-location 
trades with liquidity and volatility with the dependent variables being liquidity and volatility 
respectively.  
3.4.2 Liquidity Regression Results 
 
            Table 3.6 Liquidity Regression Results                                
Summary Statistics: 2014:07-2015:11 (T = 17) Dependent variable: Liquidity                                  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.240871 0.031137 7.7359 <0.00001 *** 
Trades 6.17169e-08 1.23313e-08 5.0049 0.00016 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.390000 S.D. dependent var  0.058952 
Sum squared resid  0.020827 S.E. of regression  0.037262 
R-squared  0.625457 Adjusted R-squared  0.600488 
F(1, 15)  25.04886 P-value(F)  0.000157 
Log-likelihood  32.86823 Akaike criterion -61.73646 
Schwarz criterion -60.07003 Hannan-Quinn -61.57081 
rho -0.281927 Durbin-Watson  2.509583 
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The regression results show that the R-squared is 0.62547. This means that co-location trades 
predict about 62.5% of the variation in liquidity. The p-value also shows us that co-location 
variable is significant. Now linking the first part of the chapter which showed that after co-
location the mean liquidity increased to 0.0171, this shows that there is a relatively strong link 
between co-location trades and overall liquidity. The regression has shown that co-location does 
in fact affect overall liquidity. The reason why co-location might increase liquidity is because the 
high frequency trading involved in co-location has been shown to decrease spreads and improve 
price discovery.  Riodan (2011) found that higher system speeds led to increased liquidity and 
improved price discovery. Hendershot (2012) found that that the increase in automated trading 
caused a reduction in effective spreads, thereby reducing costs to investors. As stated in the first 
part of the chapter, the increase in liquidity in our study should be taken as positive for the JSE 
market and the regression has shown that the relationship between co-location trades and 
liquidity is significant.  
 
3.4.3 Volatility Regression Results  
 
       Table 3.7 Volatility Regression Results                                
Summary Statistics: 2014:07-2015:11 (T = 17) Dependent variable: Volatility                                   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.0212778 0.0148068 1.4370 0.17124  
Trades 1.14959e-08 5.86401e-09 1.9604 0.06879 * 
 
Mean dependent var  0.049056 S.D. dependent var  0.019230 
Sum squared resid  0.004710 S.E. of regression  0.017719 
R-squared  0.203959 Adjusted R-squared  0.150890 
F(1, 15)  3.843260 P-value(F)  0.068791 
Log-likelihood  45.50450 Akaike criterion -87.00899 
Schwarz criterion -85.34257 Hannan-Quinn -86.84335 
rho  0.471794 Durbin-Watson  1.054597 
 
The regression results show that the R-squared is 0.203959. This means that co-location trades 
predict about 20.4% of the variation in volatility. The p-value also shows us that the co-location 
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trades variable is significant although at a low level. Now linking the first part of the chapter 
which showed that after co-location the volatility increased to 0.0091, this shows that there is a 
weak link between co-location trades and volatility. The regression has shown that co-location 
trades do not affect overall volatility to a large extent. This is in line with other studies that have 
found no strong relationship between HFT and volatility. Hendershot (2009) found that 
automated trades made prices more efficient but did not contribute to higher volatility. Janeric 
(2010) stated that HFT improved liquidity and was unlikely to increase volatility. The tests and 
regression has shown that it is difficult to infer the effect of co-location trades on volatility. 
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Chapter 4: Implications of Study 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This dissertation examined a host of recent empirical and theoretical research on co-location so 
that policymakers, researchers, practitioners and other stakeholders can become familiar with the 
current state of knowledge and some of the outstanding economic issues associated with co-
location. 
In this concluding chapter, I start by highlighting briefly what each of the previous chapters 
covered. Chapter 1 introduced the issue of co-location and set the tone for the rest of the study by 
explaining high frequency trading and the main issues in the study. Chapter 2 formed the heart of 
the study and focused on explaining the microstructure of the equity market. It then gave a 
literature review on the topic of co-location and high frequency trading. In the process, issues 
like volatility and liquidity were discussed.  Chapter 3 gives the findings of tests before and after 
co-location and shows the contrasts and differences with previous empirical studies. Regression 
analysis is then undertaken to determine effect of co-location on market quality. 
The rest of the chapter focuses on presenting findings and stating the implications of the study. I 
present my findings on the JSE since this is the main contribution of the study and explain how it 
will affect market participants. The issue of co-location is important to market participants and 
regulators because it will change some market quality factors such as liquidity and volatility.  
4.2 Overview of Previous Chapters 
Chapter 1 introduced the reader to co-location. It gives a description of the JSE, discusses the 
effect technology has had on the markets and gives a South African context .Lastly it talks about 
the crashes that have occurred “supposedly” because of high frequency trading. Co-location is 
when financial institutions are allowed to place their trading servers in the same data centers that 
house an exchange’s computer servers (Brogaard et al., 2013). The advancement of technology 
has resulted in co-location which has enabled HFT to take place. Before the advent of 
technology, most market makers were humans who were usually found on the trading floor of an 
exchange. It was clear to the JSE that in order to remain a world-class and relevant exchange in a 
highly competitive industry, it had to remain abreast of technological advances (Pickworth: 
2013). Clients demand faster execution speeds and exchanges need to offer these in order to 
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compete. However it has been claimed that there are some disadvantages associated with high 
frequency trading and it has been linked to some crashes such as the Knight Capital and 
Facebook IPO crash.  
Chapter 2 presented a literature review on the topic of co-location and high frequency trading. It 
also gave a microstructure of the equity market that explains key concepts such as order-flow. 
Equity market microstructure addresses issues that involve the placement and handling of orders 
in a securities market, and their translation into trades and transaction prices in a marketplace 
(Brogard: 2012). Order-flow forms a part of this, and conveys information about fundamentals 
because it contains the trades of those who analyse fundamentals. In this sense, it is a 
transmission mechanism and lays the basis for understanding how the market works. The 
literature review given is quite extensive on empirical studies which have been done to show 
effect of co-location and high frequency trading on the market.  
Finally, Chapter 3 conducted empirical analysis on the effect of co-location on the JSE and also 
ran a regression to determine the effect of different factors on co-location. The volatility before 
was compared to the volatility after co-location and it was found that the average volatility had 
increased. In addition to volatility, the liquidity was compared for the two periods showing that it 
had increased after co-location. Interest rates and the exchange rate were also identified as 
having an impact on co-location and a regression was run to see how much these two factors 
were correlated to co-location. Co-location trades obtained from the JSE were taken as the 
dependent variable and volatility, liquidity, interest rates and exchange rate were the regressors. 
A dummy variable was also included in the regression to see the effects of the policy changes 
which were in the form of interest rate rises by the central bank between July 2014 and 
November 2015. Interest rate and DummyPolicyChange were found to be the only insignificant 
variables. Volatility and exchange rate were the most significant variables affecting co-location 
trades, with liquidity lower but still giving a good significance. 
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4.3 Findings 
This section discusses the findings from the empirical tests done in Gretl before and after co-
location as well as the regression analysis, all done in Chapter 3. Findings are divided into two 
parts. The first section presents the findings on the factors affecting co-location and how 
significant the test results were. The second section discusses the results of the regression 
analysis done to determine effect of co-location on liquidity and volatility. 
4.3.1 Factors Affecting Co-location 
Chapter 3 gave great insight into the factors affecting co-location and was useful in determining 
whether co-location improves market quality factors such as volatility and liquidity. The factors 
which affect co-location trades are exchange rate, interest rate, volatility and liquidity.  In the 
empirical analysis, it was found that the interest rate is insignificant. The most significant 
variables were the exchange rate, volatility and liquidity (in that order). From the results of 
empirical analysis, if we wanted to predict the number of co-location trades we would use the 
equation: 
Trades = 889990 + (3.88797e+06*Liquidity) + (1.13722e+07*Volatility) + (-
1.39228e+08*Interest Rate) + (630642 * Exchange_Rate)  
The exchange rate is positively related to co-location trades. The higher nominal exchange rate 
means that other foreign currencies will appreciate in relation to the rand and this will mean 
investors will find it cheaper to invest in shares. Mao and Ka (1990), found that an appreciation 
in the currency of export-dominant economies tends to negatively influence the domestic stock 
markets of those economies. Traders are aware of the factors affecting the rand and whether they 
are the result of short-term sentiment or longer-term structural factors. The latter will result in a 
drastic decline in both direct investment as well as portfolio Investment. This will most likely 
cause the JSE shares to fall and reduce overall trades.   
 It is unclear whether volatility is positively or negatively correlated with co-location trades. This 
is because some strategies require high volatility while others will work with low volatility. 
There is a strong relationship between volatility and market performance. Volatility tends to 
decline as the stock market rises and increase as the stock market falls. When volatility increases, 
risk increases and returns decrease. In a 2011 report, Crestmont Research examined the historical 
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relationship between stock market performance and the volatility of the market. Their research 
tells us that higher volatility corresponds to a higher probability of a declining market. Lower 
volatility corresponds to a higher probability of a rising market. This means that high frequency 
programmers will take this into account when buying and selling stocks. The higher level of 
volatility that comes with bear markets has a direct impact on portfolios (Kirilenko et al., 2011). 
At the same time that some portfolios will be falling in value, high frequency traders will be 
taking advantage of this high volatility to short sell shares and benefit from the large drops.    
Liquidity is positively related with co-location trades because investors and traders find high 
liquidity more attractive. It is easier to buy and sell and strategies can be implemented at lower 
costs. Liquidity is characterized by a high level of trading activity and small spreads between the 
bid and offer price. This means that during periods of high liquidity, high frequency traders will 
be more keen to place their trades because it is cheaper .It also reduces the probability of a 
liquidity risk should they wish to exit the position earlier than expected. Liquidity risk induces 
investors to trade fewer times and submit larger quantities in early periods. If liquidity is low it 
may be advantageous to postpone orders to see whether liquidity improves. This is why during 
period s of low liquidity, trades are less. 
4.3.2 Effect of Co-location on Liquidity and Volatility 
In order to know how co-location trades affect liquidity we ran a regression of co-location trades 
with liquidity. The regression showed that co-location does in fact affect overall liquidity and 
predicts about 62.5% of the variation in liquidity. The reason why co-location might increase 
liquidity is because the high frequency trading involved in co-location has been shown to 
decrease spreads and improve price discovery. Empirical analysis in Gretl also showed that 
liquidity increased in the pre to post co-location period. The increase in liquidity in our study 
should be taken as positive for the JSE market. As mentioned in Chapter 3, liquidity has a lot of 
advantages for the market participants. It  facilitates the entrance of informed traders, enhances 
the effectiveness of equity-based compensation to managers, reduces the cost of equity 
financing, mitigates trading frictions investors encounter when trading and lowers the immediate 
transaction costs for firms conducting large share repurchases (Brogaard: 2013). Our results are 
in line with previous papers like Malinova, Park and Riodan (2013), who found that HFT 
significantly lowers spreads and reduces trading costs for non HFT traders.   
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In order to know how co-location trades affect volatility we ran a regression of co-location trades 
with volatility. The regression showed that there is a weak link with co-location trades predicting 
only about 20.4% of the variation in volatility. Gretl empirical tests saw volatility increase after 
co-location compared to the period before. The tests and regression has shown that it is difficult 
to infer the effect of co-location trades on volatility. This is in line with other studies that have 
found no strong relationship between HFT and volatility. Hendershot (2009) found that 
automated trades made prices more efficient but did not contribute to higher volatility. 
Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009) in their study found no casual relationship between 
high frequency trading and volatility. Volatility is important for market participants and 
regulators. Market tends to fluctuate more and by a larger extent during more volatile periods. 
Overall volatility will rise when traders are concerned about risk or are becoming very fearful. 
Conversely, volatility will fall when investors are very confident or bullish. This matters to 
traders because an increase in volatility causes a rise in options. Unfortunately the empirical 
analysis was unable to establish a link between volatility and co-location.  This means that at the 
end of this paper we are still unsure on the impact of co-location on volatility.  
4.4 Implications of Study 
As stated in chapter 1, the JSE makes money from the volume of transactions, so high frequency 
traders are good for business. Higher volumes, in turn, help attract investors, creating a virtuous 
circle that benefits the exchanges. The results have shown that liquidity is now higher than 
before co-location. This means that the growing liquidity in the market can be used to attract 
more institutions and firms wishing to run trading algorithms and strategies. Dark pools are a 
term for private exchanges or forums for trading securities. Unlike stock exchanges, dark pools 
are not accessible by the investing public. Dark pools are present in the South African financial 
market. They are intended to help asset managers trade large blocks of shares without moving 
the market against them but exhibit a lack of transparency. “Dark pools are an invaluable 
execution tool for large orders and stocks which may be more difficult to trade due to wide 
spreads or low liquidity” (Goodspeed: 2013). Trades originally meant for dark pools can be now 
traded on the JSE co-location servers. By moving trades from dark pools to co-location servers at 
the JSE and encouraging institutions to use these facilities, transparency can be increased. Trades 
will be executed at fast speeds to reduce the risk of market price moving against the firm.  It will 
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also be an added advantage because liquidity in dark pools is usually low. Regulators in the USA 
have won about $150 million from Credit Suisse and Barclays for behavior in their dark pools.  
High frequency trading models can be made to comply with agreed upon order-to-trade ratios to 
avoid abuse. Monitoring order-to-trade ratios would add to market stability, enable better 
controls for message traffic and help to distinguish between those that are truly adding liquidity 
and those that are not acting in the best interest of the market. The data feeds that are available 
publicly and privately should be in sync so that one market participant does not have an undue 
information advantage over another. The South Africa Financial Services Board (FSB) has been 
the result of thoughtful regulation which promotes competition, innovation and transparency. 
Policy makers should continue to take steps to further enhance transparency and the stability of 
the market. Exchanges and regulators need to establish a robust framework to police and identify 
abuses, and to act on manipulative practices when found on the market.  
In the current market environment, several opportunities to improve stability exist. Exchanges 
should implement kill switches if it is apparent that they are being impaired or flooded with 
erroneous orders. The JSE currently only has a circuit breaker to halt continuous trading if prices 
fall by 5% for leader stocks and South Africa/UK dual listed shares. The deployment of kill 
switches, circuit breakers and other system compliance will improve investor confidence and 
market stability. Better testing environments for strategies and liquidity programs should also be 
available. In our highly complex market network, “freak events” will also occur. Practitioners 
and industry need to have contingency plans in place for containing the damage when such 
events happen. The weakness of this study is that only one market quality factor was identified to 
be affected by co-location. Other factors such as volatility were shown to have a low significant 
relationship. Subsequent research can lead to better understanding of co-location by investigating 
the correlation between co-location and volatility. Further analysis could also include an 
investigation into how co-location and the high frequency traders affect institutional investors 
and retail traders.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Technology has revolutionized trading in financial markets. Most evidence suggests that the 
increased use of technology has led to improvements in liquidity, but little empirical evidence 
exists on the channels for such improvements. This dissertation shows that the co-location event 
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at the JSE in May 2014 is associated with improved liquidity. Empirical analysis was conducted 
before and after co-location and regression analysis was undertaken. Our findings were that there 
is a positive correlation between co-location and overall liquidity which is good for the JSE. Co-
location appears to improve liquidity for all market participants primarily through the high 
frequency traders acting as market makers and lowering spreads.   
However it is still unclear as to how co-location trades and high frequency trading affects 
volatility. This finding indicates that future research on co-location and high frequency trading 
should emphasize impact on volatility. Hopefully in the near future, empirical studies can be 
undertaken to analyse how volatility is affected so that market participants can be aware. This 
would also help markets to be structured in a way that produces the most efficient prices.  
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